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SAY “NO” TO NOTA: MODIFYING FLORIDA’S ORGAN DONATION 
POLICY THROUGH GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF DONOR 
INCENTIVES 
Rachel A. Mattie* 
In 1984, Congress passed the National Organ Transplant Act—commonly 
referred to as “NOTA”—which prohibits the “transfer [of] any human organ for 
valuable consideration for use in human transplantation.”1 Under NOTA, a human 
organ is defined as any human “kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, 
cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof and any other human organ . . . 
specified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services by regulation.”2 Three 
years later, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
amended the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) encouraging all states to 
prohibit the sale of organs in their own individual state laws.3 In 1999, the Florida 
Legislature enacted Florida Statutes section 873.01, criminalizing the act of 
knowingly “transfer[ing] any human organ or tissue for valuable consideration” by 
second degree felony.4 The stated purpose of the legislation was to “address the 
nation’s critical organ donation shortage and improve the organ matching and 
placement process.”5 However, the real result has been quite the contrary, as many 
scholars argue that NOTA has in fact limited access to life-saving organs in the 
United States by codifying a controversial and hotly debated position—that 
donating an organ for any purpose other than one of pure altruism is entirely 
unethical.6  
In 2004, Dr. Sally Satel, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 
was thrown into the sea of Americans in need of an organ transplant when her 
doctor informed her that one of her own kidneys had “retired early.”7 Being a 
seasoned physician herself, she did not panic at the initial diagnosis; however, the 
thought of being sentenced to painful kidney dialysis as a consequence of not being 
 ________________________  
 * Rachel A. Mattie, J.D., Barry University School of Law, 2014, Editor-in-Chief, Barry Law Review, 
2013–2014; B.S. Legal Studies, University of Central Florida, 2011.  
 1. Nat’l Organ Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 273–274 (2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a). 
 2. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1). 
 3. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 10(a), 8A U.L.A. 62 (2003). 
 4. FLA. STAT. § 873.01 (2011). 
 5. National Organ Transplant Act, ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/policiesAndBylaws/nota.asp (last visited Dec. 27, 2013). 
 6. Joan Shipman, Discerning Public Opinion: How Financial Incentives Could Improve Organ Donation, 
Reduce Donor-Recipient Gap, SUPRASPINATUS (June 16, 2008, 7:28 PM), 
http://nysbar.com/blogs/healthlaw/2008/06/discerning_public_opinion_how_1.html. 
 7. Sally Satel, An Internet Lifeline, in Search of a Kidney, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/22/health/22essa.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0  [hereinafter Satel, Internet 
Lifeline]. 
1
: Say "NO" to NOTA
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2014
362 Barry Law Review Vol. 19, No. 2 
 
able to find a donor was a devastating realization that even Dr. Satel could not 
escape.8 She describes this procedure in one of her articles:  
Imagine you are hooked up to a machine three times a week for 
hours at a time. The machine extracts deadly bodily toxins from 
your blood that your kidneys can no longer clear themselves. You 
come back from these dialysis sessions exhausted and depressed; 
meanwhile, dialysis itself takes a toll on your heart and generally 
shortens your lifespan.9 
Dr. Satel continued to play the waiting game for an agonizing two years until 
finally, in May of 2006, she was fortunate enough to receive a kidney from a 
friend.10  
Regrettably, not all patients are so lucky. Lisa Cunningham, a devoted mother 
residing just outside of Boston, developed Type 1 diabetes years before she was put 
on dialysis.11 As of 2006, Cunningham was facing at least five more years on the 
organ waitlist, regulated by the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network 
(OPTN).12 In an effort to save her own life, she decided to take matters into her 
own hands and go public with her epic search for a kidney—a private solicitation 
by definition.13 As a result, the Beth Israel Deaconness Medical Center refused to 
perform the transplant if she did find a kidney through private solicitation.14 The 
center feared what would most certainly result in criminal penalty if they aided 
Cunningham in a violation of NOTA.15 Tragically, in 2007, the wait proved too 
long and Cunningham died leaving behind a young son.16 But she is not the only 
one left to face this impossible battle alone. 
Hitting a little closer to home is the story of Florida native, Alex Crionas. In 
2004, fearing he would never reach the top of the organ waitlist, Crionas took 
matters into his own hands and started a private website telling the story of his two-
year search for a kidney.17 He received harsh criticisms from medical ethicists 
nationwide, such as bioethicist Arthur Caplan and Dr. Douglas Hanto.18 They 
classified this private search, and others like it, as an immoral attempt to “subvert 
 ________________________  
 8. Id. 
 9. Sally Satel, The Kindness of Strangers and the Cruelty of Some Medical Ethicists, THE WEEKLY 
STANDARD (May 29, 2006), available at http://www.sallysatelmd.com/html/a-ws5.html [hereinafter Satel, 
Kindness]. 
 10. Sally Satel, Organs for Sale, THE AMERICAN (Oct. 14, 2006), 
http://www.american.com/archive/2006/november/organs-for-sale. 
 11. Satel, Kindness, supra note 9. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id.  
 15. Rob Haneisen, Wait for Donor Proved Too Long for Ashland Woman, WICKEDLOCAL.COM (May 23, 
2007, 6:52 PM), 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:IjA8upiwM_AJ:www.wickedlocal.com/ashland/news/x13
25697428+&cd=6&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Satel, Kindness, supra note 9. 
 18. Id. 
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the waiting list.”19 Crionas finally found a donor, Patrick Garrity, but could not find 
anyone to perform the transplant for the same reasons Lisa Cunningham was given 
the cold shoulder by hospitals—he was guilty of private solicitation.20 Despite the 
fact that Crionas and Garrity met at a party and not through the website, several 
hospitals were still reluctant to operate because of the existence of his website, in 
fear of the repercussions of NOTA.21 The transplant was finally performed in 2005 
by the brave transplant surgeons at Florida Hospital Orlando, but not before 
Crionas was rejected by several other transplant centers.22 
The lack of available organs for those awaiting transplants is an alarming 
national statistic that continues to rise. In 2005, there were over 88,000 Americans 
on the organ transplant waitlist.23 Today, there are currently over 121,000 people 
awaiting an organ24—106,000 of whom are awaiting kidneys25—yet less than one-
fourth will receive an organ within the next year due to a substantial gap between 
the demand for organs and the supply of willing donors.26 It is predicted that over 
6500 people will die awaiting an organ transplant this year.27 As the doctrine of 
supply and demand would have it, the only logical solution to this problem is an 
increase in organ supply.  
The purpose of this comment is to examine the most effective solution to the 
nation’s organ shortage—offering direct financial incentives to organ donors—and 
to increase the acceptance of such incentives through a practical analysis. Part I 
further identifies the problem with a variety of medical statistics and evaluates past 
attempts at solving the organ donor crisis through indirect financial incentives. Part 
II considers arguments both for and against allowing direct payment for organs, 
and also assesses the validity of both sides’ contentions. Finally, Part III examines 
the legislative obstacle blocking this proposal—NOTA’s current prohibition on 
donor incentives—and proposes a revision of the law followed by the 
establishment of a government-regulated market system for organ procurement and 
compensation. 
 ________________________  
 19. Id. 
 20. Terry O. Roen, “Kindred Spirit” Donates a Kidney, ORLANDOSENTINEL.COM (Aug. 13, 2005), 
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2005-08-13/news/KIDNEY13_1_garrity-florida-hospital-orlando-kidney. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Satel, Internet Lifeline, supra note 7. 
 24. Transplant Trends, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, http://www.unos.org (last visited Dec. 
27, 2013). 
 25. Overall Waitlist by Organ, Kidney, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/rptData.asp (last visited Dec. 27, 2013). As of December 2013, there 
were 106,563 people on a waitlist for a kidney (Now Updated to 106,977 as of March 2014), 16,555 for a liver 
(Now updated to 16,424 as of March 2014), 1192 for a pancreas (Now updated to 1194 as of March 2014), 3715 
for a heart (Now updated to 3828 as of March 2014), 1658 for a lung (Now updated to 1668 as of March 2014), 
and 262 for an intestine (Now updated to 264 as of March 2014). Id. This list does not account for the people 
waiting for multiple organs. Id. 
 26. Satel, Internet Lifeline, supra note 7. 
 27. The Need Is Real: Data, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/about/data.html (last visited 
Dec. 27, 2013). An average of eighteen Americans die each day because of the shortage of organ donations. Id. 
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I.  LOW SUPPLY VS. HIGH DEMAND: THE ORGAN SHORTAGE CRISIS 
The demand for organ transplantation has skyrocketed in the last twenty years, 
due in part to an increase in the failure of vital organs caused by a myriad of 
biological factors.28 However, this increase in demand has not been complemented 
by an increase in supply, leaving the United States in what can only be described as 
an organ shortage crisis.29 In 1989, there were approximately 18,000 people on the 
OPTN waitlist and only 6000 donors (both living and deceased).30 By 2009, the 
number on the waitlist had jumped from roughly 18,000 to 105,567, but the 
number of willing donors only increased from 6000 to 15,000.31 The gap continues 
to widen today—as there are currently over 121,000 people awaiting organ 
transplantation and an estimated 11,000 registered donors.32 
Every ten minutes someone is added to the OPTN waitlist, and there are 
enough people on the waiting list today to fill a large football stadium more than 
twice.33 Each day, approximately eighteen American citizens die because they did 
not receive a transplant in time, totaling almost 7000 preventable deaths per year.34 
It is estimated that one organ donor can save up to eight lives.35 In 2010, there were 
almost 2.5 million deaths in the United States36—what if every one of those people 
was willing to become organ donors? What if every one of those people was like 
thirteen-year-old Taylor Storch?37 
Taylor Storch is remembered by her family as a “giving, wonderful person.”38 
In March 2010, Taylor set out for one last run during a family skiing trip in 
Colorado.39 She slipped and fell backwards, hitting her head on a tree, resulting in 
irreversible brain damage.40 In the midst of coping with the loss of their loving 
daughter, the Storchs were asked by doctors if Taylor’s organs would be available 
for donation.41 Her mother immediately said that they would, later telling reporters, 
“that’s what Taylor would do . . . . She was so giving, and that choice was very, 
very easy.”42 No one can appreciate Taylor’s gift, and the gift of her family, better 
than Patricia Winters of Arizona, who at the time of Taylor’s death was suffering 
 ________________________  
 28. Id. 
 29. Charles C. Dunham IV, “Body Property”: Challenging the Ethical Barriers in Organ Transplantation 
to Protect Individual Autonomy, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 39, 42 (2008). 
 30. The Gap Continues to Widen, ORGANDONOR.GOV, 
http://www.organdonor.gov/about/graphdescription.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2013). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Transplant Trends, supra note 24 (updated to approximately 14, 000 donors as of March, 2014). 
 33. The Need Is Real: Data, supra note 27. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Why Donate?, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/whydonate/index.html (last visited 
Dec. 27, 2013). 
 36. The Need Is Real: Data, supra note 27. 
 37. Michael Inbar, Mom Hears Late Daughter’s Heart Beat—Inside Donee, TODAY HEALTH (Oct. 1, 2010, 
9:49 AM), http://www.today.com/id/39456266/#.UnraJCTz3Zl. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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through acute cardiomyopathy.43 Patricia’s heart condition had reached such 
severity that she was no longer able to care for her two sons.44 “I felt like I wasn’t 
going to last too long,” she told reporters in an October 2010 interview.45 Soon 
after, in a hospital in Tucson, the heart of thirteen-year-old Taylor Storch was 
successfully transplanted to thirty-nine-year-old Patricia Winters.46 That following 
September, the Storch family was finally able to meet the woman whose still 
beating heart once belonged to their daughter.47 They gathered together and 
embraced Winters in remembrance of Taylor, eventually taking a moment to listen 
to Taylor’s heart beat inside the woman whose life was forever changed by their 
selfless compassion.48 While this story is heartwarming, and serves to restore our 
faith in humanity, the truth is that families like the Storchs—and spirits like 
Taylor—are few and far between. 
In Florida alone, there are approximately 5454 men, women, and children 
waiting for a life-saving organ.49 Most will wait approximately two years for a 
transplant, a waiting time that is often too late.50 The Florida Legislature has 
recognized the need and since then, there have been several educational outreach 
programs implemented51—but are they enough? In 2009, the Florida Legislature 
established the Joshua Abbott Organ and Tissue Donor Registry after finding “that 
there is a shortage of organ and tissue donors in [the] state willing to provide the 
organs and tissue that could save lives or enhance the quality of life for many 
persons.”52 However, the registry failed to improve the organ donor crisis suffered 
by Floridians, as the gap between the number of people on the waitlist and the 
available organs has continued to widen.53  
There have been several attempts at improving the organ donor crisis by 
increasing the rate of altruistic consent through public education but none have 
seen adequate results.54 Between 1994 and 2004, the “altruistic approach” only 
 ________________________  
 43. Inbar, supra note 37. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Overall Waitlist by Age in Florida, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/stateData.asp?type=state (last visited Dec. 27, 2013). (To view a table 
with updated data, select “Florida,” select “Waiting List,” then select “Organ by Age.”) 
 50. Overall Waitlist by Waiting Time in Florida, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/stateData.asp?type=state (last visited Dec. 27, 2013). (To view a table 
with updated data, select “Florida,” select “Waiting List,” then select “Organ by Waiting Time.”) 
 51. See, e.g., About Donate Life Florida, DONATE LIFE FLORIDA, 
http://www.donatelifeflorida.org/content/about/?selected=3 (last visited Jan. 12, 2013). 
 52. FLA. STAT. § 765.5155(1)(a) (2009); About Donate Life Florida, supra note 51. 
 53. FLA. STAT. § 765.5155(1)(a) (2009); About Donate Life Florida, supra note 51. 
 54. Robert Arnold, Financial Incentives for Cadaver Organ Donation: An Ethical Reappraisal, MEDSCAPE 
EDUCATION, http://www.medscape.org/viewarticle/465739 (last visited Jan. 12, 2013) (log-in required) (This 
article is also available for PDF download at 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDQQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F
%2Fasts.org%2Fdocs%2Fdefault-source%2Feducation%2Ffinancial-incentives-for-deceased-organ-
donation.pdf%3Fsfvrsn%3D0&ei=1Um-
UoveNaSQ2gXO5YG4CA&usg=AFQjCNE0e4tYNtEUsdiYKee6fB9bxUBSyA&bvm=bv.58187178,d.b2I). 
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resulted in a mere fifteen percent (15%) increase in organ procurement.55 This 
caused the majority of patients to seek live donors and turn to private solicitation 
despite the dangers of violating NOTA.56 Opponents of direct financial incentives 
argue that there are other, more ethical, avenues for increasing organ procurement 
including income tax benefits and raising awareness through government funded 
programs.57 However, this argument fails to consider the failed attempts at such 
alternatives. 
Seventeen states (not including Florida) currently offer tax incentives to those 
who donate organs, but studies have shown that this is doing nothing to increase 
the donor supply.58 Some attribute this lack of results to the insignificant amount of 
the tax benefit, which currently converts to less than $1000 in reduced taxes for an 
average American family.59 It is clear to see why this incentive is not exactly 
enticing anyone because the “financial burden” for a living organ donor can exceed 
$3000 in travel expenses, hospitalization, and medical costs.60 A study published 
by the American Journal of Transplantation shows that there is absolutely no 
significant effect on donation rates due to these tax benefit policies.61  
There is a powerful devotion to the altruistic system62 in the United States, 
especially in the realm of organ donation.63 While this commitment to altruism has 
its moral advantages, the practical disadvantages to society are more significant. 
Philanthropists and bioethicists alike agree that organ donation, procurement, and 
transplantation exist to save lives; it has also been stated that allowing people to 
contract with one another for organs is “[a]n obvious and straightforward approach 
to solving the organ . . . shortage.”64 However, the prohibition established by 
NOTA seems to treat saving lives as a secondary goal, placing it behind improving 
 ________________________  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Richard Knox, Tax Breaks for Organ Donors Aren’t Boosting Transplant Supply, NPR HEALTH BLOG 
(Aug. 31, 2012, 8:46 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/08/30/160338259/tax-breaks-for-organ-donors-
arent-boosting-transplant-supply. The following states offer donor tax breaks: Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Kay Bell, Tax Breaks for Organ Donors, BANKRATE.COM (Sept. 6, 2012, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.bankrate.com/financing/taxes/tax-breaks-for-organ-donors/. “Would an increase in both the types of 
tax breaks or the number of states that offer them help increase the live donor pool? Probably not, according to a 
new study published in the American Journal of Transplantation.” Id. See also Kelly Philips Erb, A Kidney for a 
Tax Break?, FORBES (Sept. 2, 2012, 3:06 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2012/09/02/a-kidney-
for-a-tax-break/. Despite the tax breaks in various states, “there has been no increase in organ donation rates.” Id.  
 62. “Pure altruism is giving without regard to reward or the benefits.” Altruism–definition, SCIENCE 
DAILY, http://www.sciencedaily.com/articles/a/altruism.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2013). 
 63. James F. Blumstein, The Use of Financial Incentives in Medical Care: The Case of Commerce in 
Transplantable Organs, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 4 (1993). “[A] core value shaping organ transplantation policy was 
the goal of ‘[p]romoting a sense of community through acts of generosity.’” Id. See also U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., Report of the Task Force on Organ Transplantation, Organ Transplantation: Issues and 
Recommendations (1986). 
 64. Peter Aziz, Establishing a Free Market in Human Organs: Economic Reasoning and the Perfectly 
Competitive Model, 31 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 67, 68 (2009) (quoting David Kaserman, Market for Organs: Myths 
and Misconceptions, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 567, 568 (2002)). 
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the ideals of community and generosity. In 1986, the Department of Health and 
Human Services Task Force on Organ Transplantation reported that the central 
goal in establishing the current organ transplantation policy is to promote “a sense 
of community through acts of generosity.”65 Congress is placing the crucial 
medical needs of patients in the shadows, while focusing on how to make sure 
donors “feel good” about their contribution.66 While this is a worthy objective, it 
should not be the primary one, nor is it relevant to solving the organ shortage. 
Other proposed solutions include instituting a policy of presumed consent to 
improve the matching system.67 With presumed consent, doctors would be able to 
assume that the organs of deceased patients can be used for transplant unless the 
family of the patient, or the patient himself, has previously expressed refusal.68 
However, this would do nothing to encourage living donors, and it also has the 
potential to inspire costly litigation between families and transplant surgeons.69 
Furthermore, any improvement in the organ matching system will have no effect 
on the shortage of organs available—while it is a commendable goal, it does not 
address the problem. 
II.  THE HUMAN ORGAN MARKET: A PRACTICAL SOLUTION  
The only solution is more organs. In the U.S., we need a regulated 
system in which compensation is provided by a third party 
(government, a charity or insurance) to well-informed, healthy 
donors. Rewards such as contribution to retirement funds, tax 
breaks, loan repayments, tuition vouchers for children and so on 
would not attract people who might otherwise rush to donate on 
the promise of a large sum of instant cash in their pockets.70 
In 1983, Dr. Barry Jacobs, founder of the International Kidney Exchange, 
asked that Congress create a fund to compensate families of organ donors, 
postulating that this would spike donor involvement.71 Jacobs wanted to broker 
kidneys through a private company—an international kidney exchange.72 In 
response, Congress enacted NOTA just a year later prohibiting the sale of human 
organs from either dead or living donors.73 The penalty for violation is currently up 
 ________________________  
 65. Blumstein, supra note 63, at 4. 
 66. See id. 
 67. Presumed Consent Not Answer to Solving Organ Shortage in U.S., Researchers Say, JOHNS HOPKINS 
MEDICINE (Nov. 29, 2011), 
http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/media/releases/presumed_consent_not_answer_to_solving_organ_shortage
_in_us_researchers_say. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.   
 70. Sally Satel, The Market for Kidneys, Livers, and Lungs, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2011) 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204554204577023623689583052.html. 
 71. Alicia M. Markmann, Comment, Organ Donation: Increasing Donations While Honoring Our 
Longstanding Values, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 499, 505–06 (2005). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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to $50,000 in fines and a five-year prison sentence.74 Since NOTA’s enactment, 
there has been popular debate on the issue of whether the proposal of Dr. Jacobs 
was an ethical and legal one.75 The debate centers around several key points 
including the rationality of NOTA as it exists and the morality of a human organ 
market.76 Among the most commonly raised concerns are whether a market system 
for organs would uphold the principles of equity and whether such a market could 
be properly regulated. 
Opponents of the organ market system contend that the law is rational as it 
currently exists because it was written without ambiguity and follows the ethical 
principles of society. However unambiguous the language may seem, there is still a 
somewhat contradictory nature to the effects of the statute. NOTA clearly states 
that “it shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or 
otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human 
transplantation.”77 However, NOTA allows human organ paired donations, 
whereby two individuals may trade organ for organ, but not organ for money.78 For 
example, if Donor A wishes to donate a kidney to Patient A but he is biologically 
incompatible, and Donor B wishes to donate a kidney to Patient B but he is also 
biologically incompatible, then all parties may enter into a legally enforceable 
contract under which Donor A promises to deliver his kidney to Patient B and 
Donor B in turn promises his kidney to Patient A.79  
Valuable consideration is commonly defined as “an equivalent or 
compensation having value that is given for something acquired or promised . . . 
that may consist either in a benefit accruing to one party or a loss falling upon 
another.”80 It has also been defined as the transfer of valuable property among 
donors and recipients in a sales transaction.81 NOTA’s prohibition on the exchange 
of money for organs is therefore incongruous with its permission of organ paired 
donations, because under contract law the organs in paired donations are valuable 
consideration—they represent a detriment to the initial owners and a benefit to all 
involved. Allowing the sale of an organ for an organ is effectively the same as 
allowing the trade of an organ for money because the organs still represent a value 
in the transaction—a bargained-for-exchange still exists. The Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts states: “[T]o constitute consideration, a performance or a 
return promise must be bargained for.”82 “A performance or return promise is 
bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is 
 ________________________  
 74. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(b) (2006); David I. Flamholz, A Penny for Your Organs: Revising New York’s Policy 
on Offering Financial Incentives for Organ Donation, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 329 (2006). 
 75. Donald Joralemon, Shifting Ethics: Debating the Incentive Question in Organ Transplantation, 27 
JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS (2001), available at http://jme.bmj.com/content/27/1/30.full. 
 76. Id. 
 77. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2006). 
 78. Id. The prohibition on selling organs “does not apply with respect to human organ paired donation.” Id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. Markmann, supra note 72, at 500–01; Valuable Consideration, WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 
1382 (11th ed. 2003). 
 81. Ritsch M. E. Jr. Memorandum from the Gen. Couns. to United Network for Organ Sharing. Intended 
recipient exchanges, paired exchanges and NOTA § 301. (Mar. 7, 2003). 
 82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1) (1981). 
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given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.” 83 Furthermore, “[t]he 
performance or return promise may be given to the promisor or to some other 
person.”84 
Opponents fervently argue that lifting the ban on the sale of organs will create 
a black market, however the enactment of NOTA’s ban has actually contributed to 
the rise of the black market problem.85 The black market for organs already 
exists—and is actually thriving—due to a lack of organ supply and an extensive 
waitlist.86 People have attempted to use social media sites such as Facebook to buy 
and sell organs and the trend is spreading internationally.87 In 2009, a man sold his 
kidney for $20,000 and lied to the transplant hospital in order to get the procedure 
done.88 Auctions for kidneys on eBay are consistently uncovered and the bids can 
range from thousands to millions of dollars.89  
Another objection to allowing financial compensation is based on the notion 
that an organ marketplace will destroy the principles of equality by only benefitting 
the wealthy and ensuring that only the richest will be able to purchase organs.90 It 
is estimated that one kidney has the black market price of $30,000; however, that 
does not necessarily mean that this is the price the government will charge for the 
organ in a well-regulated system.91 In fact, the exact opposite is likely to occur, 
because a government-regulated market system would eliminate the existence of 
bidding wars that tend to drive up the cost of any merchandise, establishing a new 
fair price to be determined by the government according to the scheme of supply 
and demand. Opponents also argue that the poor will feel coerced to sell their 
organs due to the high price paid by the government.92 However, this concern is 
illogical, because it assumes that America’s poor are incapable of making rational 
decisions simply because of their financial situations. The argument stereotypes 
poor people as being irrationally desperate and incompetent. 
It has also been debated that allowing the sale of organs will kill the notion of 
altruism, turning off the purely generous donor because of the existence of an 
 ________________________  
 83. Id. § 71(2) (emphasis added). 
 84. Id. § 71(4). 
 85. Henry Ritter, Dead on the Wait-List: The Case for Legalized Organ Sales, POINT OF VIEW (Oct. 18, 
2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.bbnpov.com/?p=1214. 
 86. Id. See also Drew Griffin & David Fitzpatrick, Donor Says He Got Thousands for His Kidney, CNN 
(Sept. 2, 2009, 2:45 PM), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-09-01/world/blackmarket.organs_1_kidney-transplants-
kidney-donor-kidney-specialist?_s=PM:WORLD. 
 87. Illegal Selling of Organs on Facebook Is a Problem in the U.K., NEWS.COM.AU (Mar. 10, 2014, 5:28 
PM), http://www.news.com.au/technology/online/illegal-selling-of-organs-on-facebook-is-a-problem-in-the-
uk/story-fnjwnhzf-1226850612858. 
 88. Griffin & Fitzpatrick, supra note 86. 
 89. Amy Harmon, Auction for a Kidney Pops up on eBay’s Site, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 1999), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/03/us/auction-for-a-kidney-pops-up-on-ebay-s-site.html. 
 90. Claire Andre & Manuel Velasquez, Kidneys for Sale, SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY: ETHICS, Vol. 1, No. 
2 (Winter 1988), available at http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/iie/v1n2/kidneys.html. 
 91. Tammy Leitner & Lisa Capitanini, Market for Black Market Organs Expands (May 21, 2014, 11:13 
AM), http://www.nbcchicago.com/investigations/Market-For-Black-Market-Organs-Expands-259889741.html. 
 92. Tarif Backdash & Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Is It Ethical for Patients with Renal Disease to Purchase 
Kidneys from the World’s Poor?, PLOS MEDICINE (Oct. 24, 2006), 
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0030349. 
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organ market; the fear is that these donors will refuse to donate altogether.93 This is 
highly unlikely and unsubstantiated. In fact, surveys have shown just the opposite. 
The NPR-Thomson Reuters Health Poll from 2012, found that sixty percent (60%) 
of people in the United States support allowing financial incentives to organ donors 
and do not find any connection between a market system and a decline in 
altruism.94 Forty percent (40%) of those surveyed said they themselves would pay 
directly for a kidney.95 Furthermore, the creation of a market system will have no 
effect on the existence of altruism in organ donation. People will be just as likely to 
donate to friends and family in need; altruism will continue to flourish within small 
communities because an incentive already exists—helping a loved one. The only 
impact will be the positive result stemming from stranger donations, a necessary 
component in organ transplantation. A well-regulated organ market will also 
reduce state costs by essentially eliminating the expense of palliative care.96 The 
more patients able to receive organs immediately, the less patients in need of long-
term treatment.97  
Critics claim that organs should not be treated as commodities; one cannot 
legally sell a human being so why should one be able to sell human body parts?98 
These individuals fail to take into account that some body parts are legal to sell.99 
Blood, sperm, and eggs are considered “taxable commodities” under current law.100 
In fact, it is perfectly acceptable to make a living solely from selling one’s own 
blood. This opens up the discussion of whether one can legally possess property 
rights in one’s own body. Courts and legal scholars alike have said “yes.”101 
According to Professor Radhika Rao, there are two types of interests one can 
possess in their body—the right of privacy or the right to property.102 While both 
theories ultimately serve the notion that one has a bundle of rights in their body, 
they offer strikingly dissimilar views on the relationship between a person and his 
or her body parts.103 The privacy concept supports the idea that a person and his or 
her body are “indivisible” and indistinct, while the property concept supports the 
conclusion that since body parts are separable from the person, one can be the legal 
 ________________________  
 93. Dunham, supra note 29, at 64. 
 94. Knox, supra note 58. 
 95. Lindsay Abrams, Study: 40% Are Okay with Paying Kidney Donors, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 1, 2013, 7:05 
AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/10/study-40-are-okay-with-paying-kidney-donors/263035/. 
 96. Palliative care is the treatment of symptoms that accompany chronic illnesses such as fatigue, shortness 
of breath, and pain. It is provided by medical professionals and serves to increase the quality of life to those who 
are battling debilitating diseases. What Is Palliative Care, GETPALLIATIVECARE.ORG, 
http://getpalliativecare.org/whatis/ (last visited June 10, 2014). 
 97. Kidney Disease, Kidney Failure, and Palliative Care, GETPALLIATIVECARE.ORG, 
http://getpalliativecare.org/whatis/disease-types/kidney-disease-kidney-failure-palliative-care/ (last visited June 
10, 2014). 
 98. Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 364 (2000).  
 99. See generally Green v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 74 T.C. 1229 (1980). (In Green v. Comm’r of 
Internal Revenue, the United States Tax Court held that body parts such as blood and plasma are “taxable 
commodities.”). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Rao, supra note 98, at 364. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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owner of their body and essentially transfer those ownership rights to others.104 
Under this theory of property, an individual can be the legal owner of his or her 
harvested organs and that ownership comes with the freedom to extract profit.105 
When applying Rao’s research, it is clear that a human organ becomes open to 
ownership when it ceases to perform its function and is extracted from the human 
body.106 Once harvested, an organ is either abandoned by its owner and free for 
capture, or the individual from whom it was removed retains a bundle of rights.107 
These rights include the right to possess, the right to use, the right to exclude 
others, and the right to transfer ownership by gift or sale.108 However, the practical 
solution of allowing people to be paid for their organs is strictly prohibited by 
NOTA and therefore, legislative reform is necessary.109 Still, opponents argue that 
selling organs for money is simply immoral; but morals walk a fine line in the legal 
realm.110 Just because it is currently against the law to sell your organs does not 
make it inherently immoral. 
Another argument against allowing financial incentives to organ donors is that 
it will lead to a slippery slope, inviting kidnapping and killing other people for their 
organs.111 These opponents argue that the opportunity for people and the 
government to reap capital from organs will lead to an onslaught of violations in 
the realm of human rights.112 This argument is without merit. First, it takes away 
from the true conflict—whether paying people for organs is immoral. Second, just 
because there is a possibility that abuse to the system will occur does not make it 
likely to occur.113 If legislation were passed based on the existence of mere 
possibilities, we would not have a majority of the statutes we have today, including 
gun rights and the ability to purchase cough medicine. Further, just because we 
read of extreme situations happening in third-world countries, it does not 
necessarily mean that such an occurrence threatens American society. Americans 
represent a far more advanced civilization distinguished daily by technological 
developments and cultural improvements; to deny the implementation of a logical 
solution based on an irrational fear is absurd.  
Supplementary, there are several ways through which the government can 
make sure system abuse does not occur. For example, in order to purchase a 
handgun in Florida, one must comply with what is known as a “waiting period.”114 
 ________________________  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 434. 
 106. Id. at 454–55. 
 107. Rao, supra note 101, at 454–55. 
 108. Id. at 369–71. 
 109. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2006). 
 110. See S.M. Rothman & D.J. Rothman, The Hidden Cost of Organ Sale, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
TRANSPLANTATION 1524–28 (2006), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1600-
6143.2006.01325.x/full. 
 111. Issues, THE ALLIANCE FOR ORGAN DONOR INCENTIVES, 
http://organdonorincentives.org/wordpress/answers-to-common-objections-to-payment-for-organs/ (last visited 
Dec. 29, 2013). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. FLA. STAT. § 790.0655(1)(a); Florida, NRA-ILA, http://www.nraila.org/gun-laws/state-
laws/florida.aspx (last updated June 19, 2013). 
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Aside from weekends and holidays, the current waiting period is three days.115 A 
well-regulated market system imposing a longer cooling-off period, perhaps one 
year, would eliminate the already unlikely risk that some donors may abuse the 
system. The system can also be equipped with restrictions on who can donate for 
payment, permitting only those donors who have taken an informative course or 
are made well aware of the risks and rules by waiver. Further, as it has already 
been stated, a market system would decrease the price of individual organs by 
eliminating bidding wars and setting a fixed, fair price.116 Thus, the payment price 
would be well below the current black market average, making it unlikely that 
someone would go through the trouble to kidnap and murder someone to harvest 
and sell their organs when there are less risky, equally as rewarding crimes.117  
One may question whether a market for human organs can be regulated by the 
government at all. Critics argue that the large opportunity for profit in such a 
system will only lead to a downfall in the market and therefore a new emergence of 
“organ-trafficking.”118 “It is already apparent that the black market flows in one 
direction; from the Third World to the First. The relative absence of regulation and 
the comparative value of the rewards mean that healthy individuals in Asia and 
Africa are victim to scavenging organ merchants.”119 The rebuttal to this concern 
has already been addressed in response to the slippery slope argument—these 
apprehensions, and others, can be put to rest by implementing a regulated system, 
tweaked to perfection over time. 
Allowing a revision of NOTA will not lead to people selling kidneys to their 
neighbors by tomorrow—it will take time and effort to create a responsible 
marketplace. However, such a goal is more than realistic if families are trusted to 
act rationally according to the law and rules of the system.120 The great thing about 
dealing with a market for organs is that even the most impoverished person would 
not choose to harvest their heart or lung in order to make money—such a decision 
would certainly lead to death and thus no donor benefit, making such a foolish 
decision highly unlikely.121 In addition to trusting the rationality of society, we 
must also trust in the rationality of our medical personnel.122 It is safe to assume 
that a reasonable, well-educated surgeon would most likely refuse to perform such 
an operation; however, it would be unreasonable for a surgeon to refuse to perform 
a kidney transplant on a young, dying boy simply because his family purchased the 
organ from someone who was otherwise unwilling to donate.123  
 ________________________  
 115. Florida, supra note 114.  
 116. Sale of Human Organs, DEBATEWISE.ORG, http://debatewise.org/debates/2623-human-organs-sale-of/ 
(last visited June 10, 2014). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Sale of Human Organs, supra note 116.  
 123. Id. 
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Perhaps the most interesting argument against direct donor incentives is that an 
organ market is inconsistent with the law and the accepted views of society.124 This 
argument poses the same dispute as previously discussed—is selling a body part 
immoral? Does “putting a price on the human body” invite “exploitation by the 
unscrupulous?”125 The evidence says “no.”126 Current healthcare services and laws 
surrounding the sale of body parts welcome a market for organ sales.127 In the 
United States, it is currently legal, and widely accepted, to receive payment for 
human eggs, blood, semen, and the wombs of the surrogate mothers.128 In the scope 
of morality, what is the difference between a kidney and a human egg? Do 
advances in medical technology play a part in deciding how moral we view 
compensated organ transplantation? 
For nearly three decades, the fight against NOTA went primarily unheard—
until 2011. In December of 2011, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a 
limited decision against NOTA. The Court held that NOTA does not prohibit 
compensating donors of blood and substances in it, including blood stem cells 
retrieved in “peripheral stem cell apheresis.”129 It was also decided that it is now 
perfectly legal to directly compensate bone marrow donors—which is expressly 
forbidden in NOTA.130 The government argued that hematopoietic cells flowing 
through the veins should be regarded as bone marrow under NOTA and therefore 
restricted from being purchased.131 The reasoning was that bone marrow itself is a 
human organ under the statute and the statute expressly states that no compensation 
is allowed for any human organ or “any subpart thereof,” and it is uncontested that 
hematopoietic stem cells are formed in the bone marrow.132 The government 
concluded that based on a logical reading of NOTA, even stem cells retrieved 
through apheresis (“from blood flowing through veins”) should be regarded as 
“subparts of bone marrow” because it formed there.133 The Court rejected this 
argument, reasoning that if cells were regarded as bone marrow simply because 
they came from bone marrow, then the statute would forbid compensating blood 
donors—a common practice.134  
The plaintiffs’ first argument was unsuccessful in Court but it expresses a 
rational position for proponents of a market-based system—what about substantive 
due process?135 The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution says that 
 ________________________  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Sale of Human Organs, supra note 116. See also Green v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 74 T.C. 1229 
(1980). 
 129. Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852, 862 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 130. Id. at 864–65. See also 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1) (2006) (“The term ‘human organ’ means the human 
(including fetal) kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart 
thereof and any other human organ . . . specified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services by regulation.”). 
 131. Flynn, 684 F.3d at 863. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Nicholas J. Diamond, Is It Time to Reconsider the National Organ Transplant Act?, SCI. PROGRESS 
(July 16, 2012), http://scienceprogress.org/2012/07/is-it-time-to-reconsider-the-national-organ-transplant-act/. 
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no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law.”136 A libertarian view of substantive due process protections raises an issue of 
whether the government should be permitted to interfere where a person is in need 
of a life-saving organ and he or she has found someone willing to sell it to them.137 
The government should not be allowed to restrict access to survival where an 
avenue for survival readily exists. 
III.  REVISING NOTA: A PROPOSITION FOR A GOVERNMENT-REGULATED 
ORGAN MARKET 
NOTA was created to increase organ donation but has resulted in the 
completely opposite outcome of sentencing thousands of people to a preventable 
death each year.138 The prohibitory provisions in NOTA stem from a congressional 
fear that allowing “valuable consideration” for organs would lead to a detriment to 
the poor and inevitably resulting in the commodification of the human body.139 
These fears are unfounded and they divert the medical and legal communities’ 
attention away from the only practical solution.  
University of Pennsylvania kidney transplant specialist Peter Reese, along with 
colleague Matthew Allen, recently proposed a trial test to evaluate the effects of 
financial kidney donor incentives.140  “Current trends regarding the use of financial 
incentives in medicine suggest that the time is ripe for new consideration of 
payments for living kidney donation,” they wrote; “[r]eassurance about the ethical 
concerns, however, can come only through empirical evidence from actual 
experience.”141  
A study published in the Clinical Journal of the American Society of 
Nephrology (CJASN) on October 24, 2013, suggests that paying living kidney 
donors $10,000 would increase the availability of kidneys by about five percent 
(5%).142 This is the equivalent of an additional 288 kidneys donations per year.143 
The study uses data such as average costs of dialysis, costs of “similar care, 
transplantation and survival rates, and time spent on transplant lists to compare a 
payment program with [the current] organ-donation system.”144 While the figures 
used in the study are based on Canadian data, researchers say the results are just as 
accurate as applied to the United States economy.145  
 ________________________  
 136. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
 137. Diamond, supra note 135. 
 138. Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America’s Organ Shortage, 13 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 78 (2004). 
 139. H.R. Rep. No. 98-575, at 8, 22–23 (1984). 
 140. Press Release, AM. SOC’Y OF NEPHROLOGY, Study Finds That Paying People to Become Kidney 
Donors Could Be Cost-Effective (Oct. 24, 2013), available at http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2013-
10/ason-sft102113.php. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Marina Koren, Would You Donate a Kidney for $10,000?, NAT’L J. (Oct. 28, 2013), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/health-care/would-you-donate-a-kidney-for-10-000-20131028. 
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The hypothesis that was tested during the study was whether a government-
regulated (or even third party) program that paid $10,000 to living kidney donors 
would save money, increase the number of successful transplants, and improve the 
outcome of patients.146 According to doctors Lianne Barnieh and Braden Manns, 
the answer is an overwhelming “yes.”147 Dr. Barnieh postulates that: 
Such a program could be cost saving because of the extra number 
of kidney transplants and, consequently, lower dialysis costs. 
Further, by increasing the number of people receiving a kidney 
transplant, this program could improve net health by increasing the 
quality and quantity of life for patients with end-stage renal 
disease.148 
The study, published by the American Society of Nephrology,149 projects that 
doing so would be “less costly and more effective than the current organ donation 
system.”150 Researchers estimate that this program would  
result in an incremental cost savings of $340 and a gain of 0.11 
quality-adjusted life years over a patient’s lifetime compared with 
the current organ donation system. Increasing the number of 
kidneys for transplantation by [ten percent (10%)] and [twenty 
percent (20%)] would translate into an incremental cost savings of 
$1,640 and $4,030 and a quality-adjusted life year gains of 0.21 
and 0.39, respectively.151 
All other proposed solutions have either failed, or are likely to fail. Tax 
benefits, which have never been offered in Florida, proved to be too low and 
otherwise ineffective in other states.152 Public education campaigns have been 
implemented nationwide but have done little to improve donor turnout. Other 
proposals such as driver’s license discounts and minimal reimbursement for travel 
and subsistence expenses have likewise failed to encourage donor participation.153 
The time has come for this country to embrace the one and only practical solution 
to the organ shortage crisis—direct financial incentives. 
The human body has already been commodified through the permittance of 
human paired donations. Whether an organ is traded for another organ or traded for 
paper, the organ still holds a value under the contract law principle of a bargained-
 ________________________  
 146. Press Release, AM. SOC’Y OF NEPHROLOGY, supra note 140.  
 147. See id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. The American Society of Nephrology (ASN) is the leading organization in the fight against kidney 
disease. ASN, http://www.asn-online.org/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2014). ASN is committed to “educating health 
professionals, sharing new knowledge, advancing research, and advocating the highest quality care for patients.” 
Id. 
 150. Press Release, AM. SOC’Y OF NEPHROLOGY, supra note 140. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.  
 153. See Flamholz, supra note 74, at 364.  
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for exchange.154 Furthermore, all parties currently involved in the organ 
transplantation process are compensated for the harvest and transplant except for 
the original donor—the most deserving participant, and the one suffering the 
detriment.155  
Organ procurement organizations (OPOs) are paid to find organs needed by 
specific patients and obtain the consent of the donor or the consent of the donor’s 
family in cases of cadaver donations.156 The OPOs then charge acquisition fees to 
recover the organ and hospitals purchase the organ from them.157 After the hospital 
purchases title to the organ from the OPOs, the patient in need pays the hospital for 
acquiring the organ, transplanting it into the patient’s body, and for the 
hospitalization and treatment following the procedure.158 All transplant surgeons, 
nurses, and hospital staff are compensated for their time and efforts spent during 
the transplant process.159 There is “valuable consideration” exchanged between 
everyone involved except for the original donor.160 
Many highly skilled scholars agree that the next step in improving the current 
situation is a market system in which the government is heavily involved and 
strictly regulates.161 Living donors will be paid a fair market price for the organ or 
bone marrow they wish to donate and families of deceased donors will be paid as 
well, most likely in a reimbursement of funeral expenses.162 The operation of the 
market will be simple and money will flow in several directions. The government 
will regulate the market through the establishment of a special agency (or OPO) 
controlled by the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN).163 
This OPO will find and purchase organs from living donors as well as the families 
of the deceased. Just like a typical contract, the agency will determine a fair market 
price, set by the current supply and demand scheme, and make an offer to the 
individual. This would not be a compulsory door-to-door sales pitch; people will be 
able to opt out of donating at all and only those who have failed to opt out will be 
contacted by offer. 
Once the OPO has purchased the organ from the individual, the organ is sold 
from the OPO to various transplant centers nationwide. This price will also be 
determined by the supply and demand scheme while also considering a desired 
profit margin set forth by the economy of sale. The transplant centers then 
 ________________________  
 154. See supra text accompanying notes 80–84. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1)–
(2) (1981).  
 155. Sara Krieger Kahan, Note, Incentivizing Organ Donation: A Proposal to End the Organ Shortage, 38 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 757, 783–84 (2009).  
 156. Kahan, supra note 155, at 784, 786 (2009). 
 157. Id. at 784.  
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 159. See id.  
 160. See id.  
 161. See Kahan, supra note 155; Christy M. Watkins, A Deadly Dilemma: The Failure of Nations’ Organ 
Procurement Systems and Potential Reform Alternatives, 5 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2005); Gregory S. 
Crespi, Overcoming the Legal Obstacles to the Creation of a Futures Market in Bodily Organs, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 
(1994); Marc S. Nadel & Carolina A. Nadel, Using Reciprocity to Motivate Organ Donations, 5 YALE J. HEALTH 
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 162. See Kahan, supra note 155, at 786, 788.  
 163. Id. at 786.  
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essentially sell the organs to patients in need. This market system will also open up 
the availability of private sale. Anyone who wishes to privately sell an organ must 
go through the government agency to overlook the transaction and make sure it 
follows specific guidelines set forth by the United Network for Organ Sharing 
(UNOS). 
In response to the question of who will be able to sell their organs, the answer 
is quite simple. Just like in the sale of human ovum, donors will be subjected to 
health checks ups, background checks, and a series of examinations to test for 
diseases such as AIDS, hepatitis, and so on.164 Typically, with blood donations, 
blood is extracted and then tested and discarded if it is found to be infected.165 
However, with organ donations, under the market system, all testing will be 
concluded before the contract is completed and payment is issued. This will further 
ensure that no donor makes an irrational, impulse decision because these tests will 
take time to complete. 
In cases of cadaveric organ donations, the government will enter into “futures 
contracts” with people who wish to donate their organs once they are deceased.166 
An adult that holds the capacity to enter into a contract will exchange a promise for 
a promise whereby the donor agrees to donate his organs after death in exchange 
for a promise from the state that his family (or his estate) will receive financial 
compensation agreed upon in the contract.167 This compensation will be “of 
moderate value and should be the lowest amount that can reasonably be expected 
to encourage organ donation.”168  
In 1995, Pennsylvania attempted something similar—a program called the 
Pennsylvania Organ Donor Awareness Fund which awarded the reimbursement of 
funeral expenses to families of donors up to $3000.169 The State repealed the 
program after being cautioned by the federal government that the program directly 
violated NOTA’s ban on the exchange of valuable consideration for organs.170 
However, in order to comply with the recommendations of government officials, 
Pennsylvania was not required to do away with the program completely, but 
merely was made to reduce the amount of the compensation from $3000 to $300.171 
Still, this was a loss as it did little to increase donor participation due to the low 
amount to be paid.172 
Therefore, in order to implement the proposed solution, NOTA must be revised 
to repeal the prohibition on allowing compensation for human organs. This 
proposal is not new. In 1993, nine years after NOTA was enacted, the OPTN 
 ________________________  
 164. See John Glasson et al., Financial Incentives for Organ Procurement: Ethical Aspects of Future 
Contracts for Cadaveric Donors, 155(6) ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 581, 584 (1995) available at 
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 165. Id.  
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 168. Glasson et al., supra note 164, at 587.  
 169. Should Organ Donors Be Compensated?, WEILL CORNELL MED. C. (Feb. 9, 2009), 
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published a report for informational purposes in order to arouse discussion within 
the medical and legal community and in order to observe a reaction to the 
controversial subject of donor incentives.173 In this White Paper, the authors 
addressed opinions from experts in transplantation, ethics, law, and economics. For 
purposes of discussion, the authors define financial incentives as “any material gain 
or valuable consideration obtained by those directly consenting to the process of 
organ procurement, whether it be the organ donor himself (in advance of his 
demise), the donor’s estate, or the donor’s family.”174 While the views were 
presented to the OPTN/UNOS’s Board of Directors, they were not adopted as 
policy due to the still present disagreement between those in favor and those 
opposed to financial incentives—primarily in the categories of morality and 
potential for exploitation.175 
As previously argued, the likelihood for exploitation is slim. However, for 
those readers who fear exploitation of the poor as a result of this market system, a 
common ground exists. Instead of immediate cash for organs, other types of 
financial incentives could be offered by the government that translate into the same 
benefit and ultimately an equal enticement factor. Tax credits have shown to be 
ineffective, but the government agency could offer vouchers for tuition, Medicare, 
or a contribution to a donor’s 401k.176 Following this model would ensure all the 
effects of a fair market value system while still protecting the country from the 
possibility that the impoverished would make hasty decisions to sell their organs.177 
Under such a system, purchases would not exist and all incentives given would be 
just that. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In 1990, the number of people on the OPTN waitlist hovered around 20,000.178 
Today, the number exceeds 116,000.179 This escalation has not been matched by an 
equal increase in donor participation, leaving the nation in a dismal organ shortage 
that is only getting worse. It is estimated that eighteen people die each day because 
of the organ donor crisis,180 and current waiting times reflect a harsh reality—that a 
person on the waitlist is more likely to die on dialysis than to receive an organ 
transplant in time.181 One of the central causes of this tragedy is NOTA’s ban on 
financial compensation for human organs, which limits organ donation to 
motivations of pure altruism. While this may seem like a worthy objective, it fails 
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to yield sufficient donations and thousands of people are dying each year because 
of irrational fears of exploitation and immorality. 
The organ shortage has already reached a critical level—a graph published by 
the OPTN illustrates the supply and demand ratio over the last two decades and 
demonstrates a consistently widening gap between the number of organ donors per 
year and the additions to the waiting list per year.182 The only probable solution is 
to lift NOTA’s ban on payment for organs and allow direct financial incentives. 
Adversaries of the organ market system rely on several arguments as to why 
NOTA’s prohibition should remain. However, none of these objections are 
convincing. Additionally, none of the objections raised in the last thirty years is 
partnered by a more promising alternative to improving the organ matching and 
placement process (which was the original intent of the Legislature in creating 
NOTA).183 By rejecting the market system proposal, the Legislature contradicts the 
original purpose of the statute. 
While unanimous acceptance is highly unlikely, a sufficient fraction of 
Americans already support the idea of allowing payment for organs. A study by the 
UNOS showed that fifty-two percent (52%) of Americans support allowing 
financial compensation for organ donations.184 In the same study, only two percent 
(2%) were reported to think that allowing such compensation is morally wrong or 
unethical.185 These results support the conclusion that society is at least sufficiently 
receptive enough for the government to implement a new system.  
Current organ donation strategies are simply not working.186 A government-
regulated market system will increase awareness, improve supply, and eliminate 
transplant tourism. It will also offset the hesitancy behind donating due to time, 
expense, and risk involved—the fear of “big risk and little reward.” Although the 
Ninth Circuit has partially addressed this issue, it is unchartered territory in the 
Florida courts.187 Individuals can expedite this process by writing to their local 
legislatures and raising awareness within the community. The Florida legislature 
needs to get behind those within the medical community that support a revision of 
NOTA in efforts to improve the organ placement process as well as the state and 
national economy.  
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